Betruger wrote:I am the past me because I remember doing everything I did. No one else does, just as I don't remember doing anything anyone else has done.
Yes, this is called the "memory theory of personal identity," and it was first proposed by Locke in the 1600s. And it's a very sensible theory, though folks will be able to trip you up on the edge cases if you use only Boolean logic with it.
Betruger wrote:It's sounding like you mean that we don't exist anywhere else than in the present moment and, in accumulation, are as legion as there are instants multiplied by so many different people. If I'm not the me I was when I was doing something this last morning, then what's the point of life extension? It wouldn't be my life extension but someone else's.
That's true, but I'm not sure where you got the idea that I would say that. You are almost exactly the same person you were this morning.
I don't see a crutch at all.
That's because you're not using one. You're using the memory theory of identity, which I consider a little coarse (there is more to who we are than just what we remember — there are aptitudes and personality traits and so on too), but is basically sound.
The crutch I've referred to is the idea that you survive if your brain is gradually replaced, while maintaining some sort of continuity, but not if it is replaced all at once, or with a procedure that interrupts continuity.
But your theory doesn't say anything at all about continuity; you are the person who remembers doing everything you did. So, if we had the technology, we could take you completely apart, and reassemble you entirely anew at another place or time, and you'd be the same person — you would survive this procedure — because you'd still remember everything you've done.
Good for you — you're ready to upload, and well ahead most people, who haven't yet thought about personal identity deeply enough and still get by pretty much identifying people by their physical bodies.
Betruger wrote:Some replies to the points made in other posts:
Someone who's had his brain on ice for a while before being reanimated.. I think that would be like simply losing time. Like watching a videotape that had been paused for a bit when it was originaly recorded.
Agreed.
Betruger wrote:Twins don't consider themselves one another.
True, because (by my theory) they don't have the same mental structure, or (by your and Locke's theory) they don't have the same memories.
Betruger wrote:There needs to be more precise terminology. I see that the "T1 and T3" persons are indeed different, but their identity is the same.
Whoops — the terminology
is precise, when it's used precisely.

In the context of personal identity, to say "the same person" means that their identity is the same; to say "different people" means people with different identities.
Betruger wrote:[Re. transporter copies...] That's just a copy. If I immediately clone a room full of myself, all of those are merely acting just as I would, and no one else but me sitting at the computer typing right now, and looking at them, and them, would know that it's them that were cloned. In that sense we are the same; same memories, same physical constitution. But otherwise it's them who've branched from my timeline thanks to the cloning event.
Hmm, I was all with you above, but now you're not making much sense — or at least, not being consistent with what you said before. If we fill a room with exact duplicates of you, they all remember everything you did. Therefore, by your original reasoning, they are all you. I would agree with that, and I'm not sure why you're trying to back away from it now and say that only one of them is you.
Betruger wrote:I think this debate is not going to be resolved because what consciousness is, is as good as supernatural, as far as empiricaly poking and prodding is concerned. There's no debating that sort of thing.
You give up too easily. This doesn't really have much to do with consciousness, and philosophical debates
can be resolved, when people apply themselves with rigor. Mathematics is supernatural too, yet mathematicians routinely resolve debates there. Philosophy is the same, just a little less rigorous.
Betruger wrote:A biological twin doesn't consider that they live on if he or she dies while the other lives on.. Those twins were the same at birth, and lived different lives from that point on. They're the same as a clone of me that's made today, except that the branch was made decades after birth, rather than at T=0.
Yes, they're the same as a
clone, not a duplicate. Clones don't share any memories or other mental structure. This is clearly not the same as a duplicate, who shares all mental structure (including memories).
Betruger wrote:That still seems wrong to me. The pattern is still some specific matter or energy. The matter and energy that constitutes Me_1 isn't the same as that of Me_2. Symetry doesn't equate to being the same.
The book analogy seems like another pov issue. I couldn't tell which book is which, but if the book were conscious, they would.
Nuts. You were doing so well for a while there.
Cheers,
- Joe