choff wrote:The official history never finds it strange that the French didn't invade Germany at the start when Hitler was fully occupied in Poland and his western border was undefended, or why the British were never routed at Dunkirk. My point is that international finance had a lot more to do with how the wars were begun, the outcome of battles, and how they were ended.
"The official history never finds it strange"...?! It is was disparaged as the Sitzkreig or phony war. Like what the F are you doing, are you trying to lose or what?
I've seen enough of that type of decision making both in national finance and in the military to finally figure out that it's deliberate, feigning as incompetence. As an example, the French air marshall scattered his aircraft throughout France to protect them against air attack, then complained he couldn't find them to stop the Germans. Consider the major decisions in the Vietnam war, the leadership ingored every last thing written by Von Clauswitz and Sun Zhu, otherwise it could have ended way too quickly, to say nothing of never taking place at all.
choff wrote:I've seen enough of that type of decision making both in national finance and in the military to finally figure out that it's deliberate, feigning as incompetence. As an example, the French air marshall scattered his aircraft throughout France to protect them against air attack, then complained he couldn't find them to stop the Germans. Consider the major decisions in the Vietnam war, the leadership ingored every last thing written by Von Clauswitz and Sun Zhu, otherwise it could have ended way too quickly, to say nothing of never taking place at all.
I.G. Farben was untouched by the bombing in WW2.
From the link:
When Leopold Amery suggested bombing the Black Forest with incendiaries to burn its ammunition dumps to Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air amazed the member of parliament by responding that the forest was "private property" and could not be bombed; neither could weapons factories, as the Germans might do the same.[3] Indeed, the sense of unreality was maintained when some British officers imported packs of foxhounds and beagles in 1939, but were thwarted by the French authorities in their attempts at introducing live foxes.[4] Civilian attitudes in Britain to their German foes were still not as intense as they were to become after the Blitz. In April 1940 a Heinkel bomber crashed at Clacton-on-Sea in Essex, killing its crew and people on the ground. They were all laid to rest in the local cemetery which was provided with support from the Royal Air Force. Wreaths
Mistakes are made in every war by winners and loser alike...but this level of incompetence? I hold to Napolean's idea of never attribute to malice that which can be explained by stupidity and incompetence. Our biggest mistake in Vietnam was coming to the aid of the French, losing their "French Indochina".
williatw wrote:Mistakes are made in every war by winners and loser alike...but this level of incompetence? I hold to Napolean's idea of never attribute to malice that which can be explained by stupidity and incompetence. Our biggest mistake in Vietnam was coming to the aid of the French, losing their "French Indochina".
French Indochina was a center of the drug trade at the time.
I've seen at least one website that described how before the German attack French whistleblowers were saying the leadership had sold out. When it's not just individual commanders but an entire set of them that consistently make the worst possible decisions you have to wonder.
In finance, if you look at 'Confessions of an Economic Hitman' and then how the Trudeau leadership managed Canada into a huge national debt, you have to think the liberals were in the hip pocket of international banking. I've known federal employees who described how when they told their managers they could do the same job for less money, the managers told them they weren't trying to save money, they were trying to waste it.
"When it's not just individual commanders but an entire set of them that consistently make the worst possible decisions ..."
I see only 2 possible conclusions:
- Commanders are being driven by a shared ideology at odds with reality.
- Commanders have a contrary objective.
Both are more than sufficient cause for removal of such commanders. The latter, if demonstrated, is grounds for severe penalty beyond removal. These conclusions are not exclusive.
The daylight is uncomfortably bright for eyes so long in the dark.