Bad planning...
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08 ... n-aground/
Another way to loose defense abilities
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CaptainBeowulf
- Posts: 498
- Joined: Sat Nov 07, 2009 12:35 am
Very interesting article, actually, and a good case study of what went on more generally.
Basically, from the mid 1990s to the mid/late 2000s there was "revolution in military affairs" mania, which became "transformation" mania, through many Western militaries. Rumsfeld was a leading proponent of this, but was by no means on his own.
I like these lines:
"To Rumsfeld, the gigantic DD-21 destroyer represented the old-fashioned approach to warfare. Small ships with small crews — that was the future to Rumsfeld."
"For all Cebrowski’s and Hughes’ passion about small-ship theory, and Clark’s and Rumsfeld’s determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and shouldn’t do."
Take a look at what happened with other services. In the Army, Shinseki pushed Stryker brigades and the "Future Combat System" (the latter basically fizzled out around 2009, although the Stryker brigades are still around and actually function reasonably well in certain types of mission).
Basically, tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles were derided as heavy, expensive, logistically demanding dinosaurs which couldn't go places without infrastructure like bridges capable of supporting 60 ton vehicles. The future was supposed to be light, heavily automated vehicles with crews of 2 or 3 that could drive across many types of different terrain on large, variable pressure wheels. Optimistic ideas of a brigade equipped with light vehicles being deployed from the continental U.S. to anywhere in the world within 96 hours were thrown around.
Again, no one had really defined what these light vehicles and rapidly deployable brigades were supposed to do.
The Canadians jumped on this bandwagon for a while too and were going to have no more tanks, just the Canadian versions of the Stryker vehicles, until they reversed course and bought 100 Leopard-2s around 2007 and immediately put them into action in Afghanistan.
Just like heavy destroyers, turned out that we still needed tanks.
Anyone interested in the Army's side of this story should probably read "Transformation Under Fire" by Douglas MacGregor and "The Army After Next" by Thomas K. Adams (if I remember the titles/names correctly). Well... actually those two are the Army's side of the story up to the mid-2000s. Not sure what you could read to get retrospective of the last 5-6 years...
Basically, from the mid 1990s to the mid/late 2000s there was "revolution in military affairs" mania, which became "transformation" mania, through many Western militaries. Rumsfeld was a leading proponent of this, but was by no means on his own.
I like these lines:
"To Rumsfeld, the gigantic DD-21 destroyer represented the old-fashioned approach to warfare. Small ships with small crews — that was the future to Rumsfeld."
"For all Cebrowski’s and Hughes’ passion about small-ship theory, and Clark’s and Rumsfeld’s determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and shouldn’t do."
Take a look at what happened with other services. In the Army, Shinseki pushed Stryker brigades and the "Future Combat System" (the latter basically fizzled out around 2009, although the Stryker brigades are still around and actually function reasonably well in certain types of mission).
Basically, tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles were derided as heavy, expensive, logistically demanding dinosaurs which couldn't go places without infrastructure like bridges capable of supporting 60 ton vehicles. The future was supposed to be light, heavily automated vehicles with crews of 2 or 3 that could drive across many types of different terrain on large, variable pressure wheels. Optimistic ideas of a brigade equipped with light vehicles being deployed from the continental U.S. to anywhere in the world within 96 hours were thrown around.
Again, no one had really defined what these light vehicles and rapidly deployable brigades were supposed to do.
The Canadians jumped on this bandwagon for a while too and were going to have no more tanks, just the Canadian versions of the Stryker vehicles, until they reversed course and bought 100 Leopard-2s around 2007 and immediately put them into action in Afghanistan.
Just like heavy destroyers, turned out that we still needed tanks.
Anyone interested in the Army's side of this story should probably read "Transformation Under Fire" by Douglas MacGregor and "The Army After Next" by Thomas K. Adams (if I remember the titles/names correctly). Well... actually those two are the Army's side of the story up to the mid-2000s. Not sure what you could read to get retrospective of the last 5-6 years...
Juliet Marine Systems Announces the First Super-Cavitating Ship
Looks much cooler from the front than from the side.
I see some Polywell applications here...
GHOST is a combination aircraft/boat that has been designed to fly through an artificial underwater gaseous environment that creates 900 times less hull friction than water.
Ghost Ship Takes Aim at Swarm AttacksThe GHOST platform and technology could reduce the need for LCS completely with the capability to travel long distances and conduct the same missions.
Looks much cooler from the front than from the side.
I see some Polywell applications here...
Downright Klingonesque, in fact.DeltaV wrote:Looks much cooler from the front than from the side.
I can visualize the pylons rotating upward (while "parked" on the ocean) so that they do double duty as wings, for sea-skimming wing-in-ground-effect flight.
Making the Shkval-like propulsion pods work in both sea and air might be tough, or maybe not.
The heavy pods and reverse wing taper would kill the in-air roll response, however. Tandem wings, two smaller pods per side?