My point for using the Sun Tzu quotation is to ask how the "protection," "reduction" or "removal" missions require bombing TV or radio headquarters.
Oh, I suppose the logic is once all of Libya is reduced to rubble, Mr. Gaddafi may give up then as there will be so much less to rule.
Where is the US Congressional Declaration of War...
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rjaypeters
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rjaypeters
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A Solution From Hell
The perils of humanitarian intervention.
By the editors of n+1Posted Wednesday, Aug. 17, 2011, at 6:57 AM ET
Concerning Mr. Gaddafi:
"Meanwhile the International Criminal Court, the pride and joy of the liberal interventionists, filed suit against Qaddafi for crimes against humanity, thereby putting him beyond the pale. How could you negotiate with someone with nothing to lose? So a nonmilitary solution to a conflict that, Obama said, would be a matter of "days, not weeks," is, as of this writing, further away than ever, even after five months of bombing."
The concluding paragraph:
"Meantime the historical record grows long enough for us to ask: Has there ever been a truly successful, truly humanitarian humanitarian intervention? Not of the Vietnamese in Cambodia, who deposed the Khmer Rouge for their own reasons (the Khmer kept crossing the border, and also murdered their entire Vietnamese population), and then replaced them with Hun Sen, who has been ruling Cambodia with an iron fist for more than 30 years. Not the Indian intervention in Bangladesh, under whose cover the Indian government arrested all student protesters in India. And not NATO in Kosovo, which, while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo, could not make it a viable state (it is now a failing state likely to be swallowed by Albania), and also led to the ethnic cleansing of the Serb population. Too bad for the Serbs, to be sure; but the creation of a safe space for the expulsion of a civilian population cannot be what anyone had in mind when they launched the planes. That there has never been a successful humanitarian intervention does not mean that there cannot be one in the future. But the evidence is piling up."
http://www.slate.com/id/2301713
The perils of humanitarian intervention.
By the editors of n+1Posted Wednesday, Aug. 17, 2011, at 6:57 AM ET
Concerning Mr. Gaddafi:
"Meanwhile the International Criminal Court, the pride and joy of the liberal interventionists, filed suit against Qaddafi for crimes against humanity, thereby putting him beyond the pale. How could you negotiate with someone with nothing to lose? So a nonmilitary solution to a conflict that, Obama said, would be a matter of "days, not weeks," is, as of this writing, further away than ever, even after five months of bombing."
The concluding paragraph:
"Meantime the historical record grows long enough for us to ask: Has there ever been a truly successful, truly humanitarian humanitarian intervention? Not of the Vietnamese in Cambodia, who deposed the Khmer Rouge for their own reasons (the Khmer kept crossing the border, and also murdered their entire Vietnamese population), and then replaced them with Hun Sen, who has been ruling Cambodia with an iron fist for more than 30 years. Not the Indian intervention in Bangladesh, under whose cover the Indian government arrested all student protesters in India. And not NATO in Kosovo, which, while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo, could not make it a viable state (it is now a failing state likely to be swallowed by Albania), and also led to the ethnic cleansing of the Serb population. Too bad for the Serbs, to be sure; but the creation of a safe space for the expulsion of a civilian population cannot be what anyone had in mind when they launched the planes. That there has never been a successful humanitarian intervention does not mean that there cannot be one in the future. But the evidence is piling up."
http://www.slate.com/id/2301713
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters
I would say to them that it is easy to proclaim when you cherry pick examples.
Maybe not intervening with Germany would have been better in WWII.
Anyway. I don't recall now why I did not repsond to you earlier post above. Might have been busy with something else.
As to your question about TV and Radio sites. They have many uses. One of which, in Lybia's case, was to maintain the fiction. Taking them out further isolates the regime. This is a standard tactic when dealing with bullies. Isolate. Credibility is hard to maintain without an audience.
Maybe not intervening with Germany would have been better in WWII.
Anyway. I don't recall now why I did not repsond to you earlier post above. Might have been busy with something else.
As to your question about TV and Radio sites. They have many uses. One of which, in Lybia's case, was to maintain the fiction. Taking them out further isolates the regime. This is a standard tactic when dealing with bullies. Isolate. Credibility is hard to maintain without an audience.
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rjaypeters
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rjaypeters
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Have we been talking about post-war actions in this thread?ScottL wrote:The reconstruction of Japan and Germany post-WWII. These are humanitarian in nature.
Remember, or look up, the U.S. rhetoric before and during the war. Was there any mention of rebuilding Germany and Japan for humanitarian reasons?
Goodness! The effort was to win the war, not rescue the poor peoples of Germany and Japan from their evil dictator.
@ladajo: By destroying the current regime's transmitting capabilities, we have also removed a potential source of intelligence. And eliminated ways for Gaddafi to broadcast his surrender, should it come to that.
The article points out how Gaddafi, through radio (TV?) broadcast, threatened the people of a rebellious city with destruction. The next morning NATO bombs fell. When I read about the that incident in the Slate article, I though "What an idiot! Never tell people you are coming to kill them!"
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters
I'm not really for intervening in foreign countries unless they pose a direct threat, but to say we weren't successful at some point in time in reconstruction of war-torn areas would be false. Of course in recent times we've been less successful.rjaypeters wrote:Have we been talking about post-war actions in this thread?ScottL wrote:The reconstruction of Japan and Germany post-WWII. These are humanitarian in nature.
Remember, or look up, the U.S. rhetoric before and during the war. Was there any mention of rebuilding Germany and Japan for humanitarian reasons?
Goodness! The effort was to win the war, not rescue the poor peoples of Germany and Japan from their evil dictator.
@ladajo: By destroying the current regime's transmitting capabilities, we have also removed a potential source of intelligence. And eliminated ways for Gaddafi to broadcast his surrender, should it come to that.
The article points out how Gaddafi, through radio (TV?) broadcast, threatened the people of a rebellious city with destruction. The next morning NATO bombs fell. When I read about the that incident in the Slate article, I though "What an idiot! Never tell people you are coming to kill them!"
The rise of powers within Germany pre-WWII can be directly associated with the effects of leaving a beaten society after a war (WWI). We saw the rise of the Nazi Party and a subsequent WWII occured. We stayed in Germany (and Japan) to rebuild their society such that a vacuum of power would not occur as to allow for the rise of such a party again.
As for post-war actions, well those are things we may consider, but since we've taken a rather back-seat approach to this Civil War only offering protection to those who wish not to fight, I'd say we're fine. We are not overthrowing the government there, we're not supply aid/guns/training to the rebels, we're simply making sure that civilians are protected.
You had better tell that to marketing, cause they didn't get the memo.Goodness! The effort was to win the war, not rescue the poor peoples of Germany and Japan from their evil dictator.
War entry in justified on many terms. Sometimes it is simple and direct, but mostly it is complex and involved, and has a trigger or threshold point.
For the "Inherent Human Rights" crowd, that has traditionally revolved around humanitarian themes. It is a prime basis of just war considerations. I thought you got my earlier hint on that.
The thing you are not seeming to consider is intended audience. In any IO, audience matters. The Lybian is no fool on this. Most of his power base relied on IO. The message was not so much for the town as it was for all the other towns. Taking down his ability to communicate to his audience isolates him. Again, bully management 101.@ladajo: By destroying the current regime's transmitting capabilities, we have also removed a potential source of intelligence. And eliminated ways for Gaddafi to broadcast his surrender, should it come to that.
The article points out how Gaddafi, through radio (TV?) broadcast, threatened the people of a rebellious city with destruction. The next morning NATO bombs fell. When I read about the that incident in the Slate article, I though "What an idiot! Never tell people you are coming to kill them
ladajo wrote:You had better tell that to marketing, cause they didn't get the memo.Goodness! The effort was to win the war, not rescue the poor peoples of Germany and Japan from their evil dictator.
War entry in justified on many terms. Sometimes it is simple and direct, but mostly it is complex and involved, and has a trigger or threshold point.
For the "Inherent Human Rights" crowd, that has traditionally revolved around humanitarian themes. It is a prime basis of just war considerations. I thought you got my earlier hint on that.
Correct. Before the Civil war, the battle cry was "Preserve the Union!" (Much the same battle cry of the British trying to keep us as colonies) After the civil war, the justification was that it was a war to free the slaves. "Marketing" adjusts the message to the zeitgeist of the time. The truth is not it's stock in trade.
‘What all the wise men promised has not happened, and what all the damned fools said would happen has come to pass.’
— Lord Melbourne —
— Lord Melbourne —
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rjaypeters
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I understand. Riddle me this: if destroying Gaddafi's ability to broadcast was such a basic move of good bully management, why wasn't this step taken months ago?ladajo wrote:The thing you are not seeming to consider is intended audience. In any IO, audience matters. The Lybian is no fool on this. Most of his power base relied on IO. The message was not so much for the town as it was for all the other towns. Taking down his ability to communicate to his audience isolates him. Again, bully management 101.
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters
I never said the guys calling the shots were very bright.
You have witnessed, but not recognized, a common theme in modern western warfighting: The conflict between policy and plans. More and more, the policy side is unclear, and that makes plans erratic. Erratic plans leads to disjointed operations.
Plans and Ops knew that isolation was/is key to managing The Lybian. However, Policy has missed the bus a few times.
You have witnessed, but not recognized, a common theme in modern western warfighting: The conflict between policy and plans. More and more, the policy side is unclear, and that makes plans erratic. Erratic plans leads to disjointed operations.
Plans and Ops knew that isolation was/is key to managing The Lybian. However, Policy has missed the bus a few times.
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rjaypeters
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I recognize competence is an increasingly rare quality. Perjorative remark to follow: Nah, I actually like some of the people who live in Europe.
EDIT: I actually appreciate the value of seeming randomness in operations as a method of confusing one's opponent. Against a weakling like Gaddafi, such sophistication is probably worthless.
EDIT: I actually appreciate the value of seeming randomness in operations as a method of confusing one's opponent. Against a weakling like Gaddafi, such sophistication is probably worthless.
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters
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rjaypeters
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The Slate answer to "The Solution from Hell"
It's Not What We Ought To Do, But What We Can Do
Rory Stewart says humanitarian intervention is like mountain rescue—protecting lives doesn't require destructive adventures.
Quote:
"To the n+1 authors, there has never been "a truly successful, truly humanitarian humanitarian intervention," not even NATO's action in Bosnia (the one instance that most skeptics concede was worthwhile) because, "while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo," the country itself is not yet "a viable state."
This is a dishonest argument in two ways. First, the authors implicitly exempt from their no-successes assessment those interventions that were not "truly humanitarian humanitarian" (their italics), which is to say, presumably, interventions that had political as well as moral motives. But it would be hard to find any interventions, successful or otherwise, for which the motives were entirely "pure." Second, by judging Bosnia a failure because it hasn't yet produced "a viable state," the authors are switching their criteria; suddenly politics are primary, and humanitarian results ("while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo") are irrelevant.
My guess (I don't know them, or even who they are, so I can't say for sure) is that the authors' main gripe is ideological. The giveaway comes in this sentence: "Wars waged by the U.S. are inevitably imperialist." (Italics added.) If that's the premise, the rest is Q.E.D.
and
"The most thorough examination of the subject that I've read in a while is a new book by Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus called Can Intervention Work?, and the way they put it is this:
It is not a question of what we ought to do but what we can: of understanding the limits of Western institutions in the 21st century and of giving credible account to the specific context of a particular intervention.
They accept the basic notion that intervention is sometimes justified. But, they warn, there are inherent limits to what this sort of intervention can accomplish, and—as Stewart puts it in his half of the two-part book—"you don't have a moral obligation to do what you cannot do."
http://www.slate.com/id/2301934/
It's Not What We Ought To Do, But What We Can Do
Rory Stewart says humanitarian intervention is like mountain rescue—protecting lives doesn't require destructive adventures.
Quote:
"To the n+1 authors, there has never been "a truly successful, truly humanitarian humanitarian intervention," not even NATO's action in Bosnia (the one instance that most skeptics concede was worthwhile) because, "while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo," the country itself is not yet "a viable state."
This is a dishonest argument in two ways. First, the authors implicitly exempt from their no-successes assessment those interventions that were not "truly humanitarian humanitarian" (their italics), which is to say, presumably, interventions that had political as well as moral motives. But it would be hard to find any interventions, successful or otherwise, for which the motives were entirely "pure." Second, by judging Bosnia a failure because it hasn't yet produced "a viable state," the authors are switching their criteria; suddenly politics are primary, and humanitarian results ("while it stopped Milosevic and ensured the safety of Kosovo") are irrelevant.
My guess (I don't know them, or even who they are, so I can't say for sure) is that the authors' main gripe is ideological. The giveaway comes in this sentence: "Wars waged by the U.S. are inevitably imperialist." (Italics added.) If that's the premise, the rest is Q.E.D.
and
"The most thorough examination of the subject that I've read in a while is a new book by Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus called Can Intervention Work?, and the way they put it is this:
It is not a question of what we ought to do but what we can: of understanding the limits of Western institutions in the 21st century and of giving credible account to the specific context of a particular intervention.
They accept the basic notion that intervention is sometimes justified. But, they warn, there are inherent limits to what this sort of intervention can accomplish, and—as Stewart puts it in his half of the two-part book—"you don't have a moral obligation to do what you cannot do."
http://www.slate.com/id/2301934/
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters
They are very shortsighted. The reall issue is whether or not the desired objective is achievable. If you pick and objective (ends) that is beyond your ways and means, you will fail without an accidental win.
The true art is in understanding your means, the ways they can be employed, and then applying them to an appropriate objective. This is a very simplified description of a very complex topic. The fundamental flaw that I see in the US in particular, is that the ends, is not picked by those who have a clue about ways and means. In fact, to take it one step further, the ones who pick means, are also somewhat disconected to ways, not to mention ends. So in effect we have a system where at the strategic and even sometimes operational and OMG! tactical levels, the three components are driven by three entities. So much for unity of effort and command...
If you like the idea of confuinsg the other guy and keeping him off balance, you should take a walk around the block with the good Colonel John Boyd. If you have not already, he is an interesting study.
The true art is in understanding your means, the ways they can be employed, and then applying them to an appropriate objective. This is a very simplified description of a very complex topic. The fundamental flaw that I see in the US in particular, is that the ends, is not picked by those who have a clue about ways and means. In fact, to take it one step further, the ones who pick means, are also somewhat disconected to ways, not to mention ends. So in effect we have a system where at the strategic and even sometimes operational and OMG! tactical levels, the three components are driven by three entities. So much for unity of effort and command...
If you like the idea of confuinsg the other guy and keeping him off balance, you should take a walk around the block with the good Colonel John Boyd. If you have not already, he is an interesting study.
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rjaypeters
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Thanks. I knew of the Fighter Mafia back in the day, but I didn't know the names of any of the members. Colonel Boyd must be turning over in his grave about the F-35A/B/C debacle. Those aircraft, IMO, are pretty much the antithesis of what he taught.ladajo wrote:...you should take a walk around the block with the good Colonel John Boyd. If you have not already, he is an interesting study.
The thought of a single-engine USN fighter ruins my digestion, but I digress.
"Aqaba! By Land!" T. E. Lawrence
R. Peters
R. Peters