GIThruster wrote: GIT's most grievous fault was to state that scientists are essentially corrupt, will usually have abusive sexual relations with students, and motivated by angst at the possibility that theories held might change so that they resist such change. He has a very very low opinion on them - so low I find it quite insulting and certainly unlike those I know.
No, I didn't say anything like this. I used the illustration of our clay feet to point out that we're all human and you don't much seem to note this is so.
If you go back to the previous thread I have many times stated this. But the human frailties that sometimes emerge do not mean that collective endeavours fall to the lowest common denominator. You imply this of science, and talked of scientsists being frail in the context of it proving that science is likely incapable of change. You also did appear to imply that events like abusive relationships between teacher and pupil happened universally, whereas they are exceptional where I work.
If you are merely expressing a rather dismal reaction to glass half full we probably have no logical argument, though I would have a very different emphasis.
The original point was and is, that scientists suffer this normal reaction to being told their foundational beliefs are wrong. Kuhn documents this time and again in his little book on scientific revolutions.
People will have all possible reactions, and it is possible historically to find examples of all. Unwillingness to give up preconceived ideas is of course a possible reaction.
My point is that scientists, and science, by definition (I can give the institutional and individual reasons) will suffer this less than most. Further, there is no evidence that this inertia prevents science from moving towards better theories.
If you pretend that such things never occur, then we can't much have a discussion about them, Tom. History is replete with examples of how those responsible for a new scientific paradigm were persecuted, and we see the same thing from religious communities. The simple fact of the matter is that when people have their foundational beliefs challenged, they experience a strong emotional reaction.
Scientific freedoms in liberal democracies are not historical, so I don't deny scientists have been persecuted. I'm arguing your point that such persecution (as a general activity, rather than an exception) is a necessary part of the scientific process or institutions.
Your argument here is like saying that science is bust because scientsists tend to have heart attacks whenever they find anything new. Well no doubt this can happen, but it does not prevent all or even most discovery.
You need a much higher standard of proof than a few historical examples to make the case that science intrinsically persecutes scientists.
The next part of your argument is to say the same of theologians. I don't have an opinion there.
The final part of the argument is to say that because this same thing happens in these two different cases, it must have the same cause, and that cause must be foundational angst.
That is not logically necessary. Given the very different avowed attitudes of scientists and religious towards faith one might well argue that what is predominant in one case is not so in the other.
Lets take the issue of BlackLight Power as an example. If Hydrino theory is correct, the Bohr model of the atom is incorrect, as is much of modern quantum mechanics. The responses to this theory are telling. Physicists are generally angry about hydrino theory and ostracize Mills without having read his enormous works. They don't look at the evidence. They don't examine the claims in detail. They have the strongest objections save those of the engineers who likewise accept the current scientific paradigm.
Sorry. I have read the BLP claims in some detail and they are major rubbish - for lots of different reasons - as is the claimed evidence. There is an outside possibility that some weird nuclear reaction could be taking place at low temperatures: it requires a lot of implausible things all to come together, and I therefore suspect strongly such an effect does not exist. It would not be Hydrino theory. But it would be great if it did exist (there is my foundational angst for you). I look at the evidence around LENR avidly and so far find it always wanting. But I'll remain open to new evidence, and it would be so much fun if there were something new that I'm prepared to continue to look even though it is highly unlikely I'll find anything. The hydrino hypothesis has so many major internal inconsistencies it scores much much lower.
Now compare these folks against the chemists. Chemists don't care about the Bohr model. They don't care about QM. Chemists don't have a dog in that hunt. If the physics is wrong, they'd just shrug their shoulders and be happy to look at the new physics. Chemists review Mills' presentations each year and have for decades. They have no problem with this.
Why the difference? Well, because if Mills is right, years and years of what the physicists have learned, taught and believed will turn out to be wrong. They have a severe stake in the game. This is why they're so emotional about BLP.
Possibly the difference is that physicists can (objectively) evaluate the hydrino theory, note its implications, understand in detail the internal inconsistencies. Whereas chemists (and you) just accept it as something which is long, complex, and sounds rather intriguing.
And just saying, I have no opinion about Mills theory. I think it is likely wrong in places but I continue to maintain that we cannot know where it is wrong until the physicists decide to examine it carefully and for 25 years they have not.
That is untrue. Physicists have examined it, but it is so full of inconsistencies that you do not emerge from the examination with anything coherent to work with.
The outcome that we have, the situation that arrises from this issue, is precisely the same whether Mills is correct or not. He would have the very same reactions he has were he right or wrong.
You cannot know that. Were he right the theory would not have such obvious internal inconsistencies. OK, it might not be correct in all details, but it would have something substantial for exploratory types to play with. There are many such in physics you know.
You assume that his work is widely regarded as rubbish because scientists are unwilling to challenge foundational belief. But how do you know that? Perhaps (as any decent physicist
would know) it is just internally inconsistent rubbish.
This is the subject of much of Kohn's book, that revolutions n scientific understanding are always accompanied by this emotional reaction, and he doesn't just make the claim, Tom. He documents it many dozens of time in the little book.
People are people. No doubt when things change there are emotions. Excitement, advocacy, anger, etc. of course. Major changes in theories are bound to have such effects, because there will be hot debate until one or other competing theory wins. That is a property of humans debating some topic.
Returning to your example we do not require all scientists to be receptive to a new theory. Just one (and then after a better write-up another one, and so on). Once a minority of scientists have found some merit in the material, if valid, it will snowball and all the "young guns" looking for nobel prizes and fast promotion will jump onto the new area.
While the area is being explored there will be arguments between old and new theories, as there should be. These will in the end get resolved by new better experimental data. Generally it is possible to devise experiments that falsify the "loser". Although I should point out that both LENR theories and BLP Hydrino theory, to my knowledge, are unfalsifiable.
I'm not being anti-science or anti-scientist to note that we're all human, and that we do have this recurring evidence from history that the scientists are not less human than the rest.
No, that is fair. But it is unfair to asume from that that specific human frailties will always dominate in a particular situation.
On the other issues, let me just say that I did not invent the distinction between fact and truth. It is as old as theories of truth--they are a part of logic and date back at least to Aristotle and very likely to the presocratics.
I understand that. Aristotelian philosophy is however not part of my foundational belief set.... Indeed i don't think
any philosophy is, I take what serves the purpose of illuminating what seems true (in a non-technical sense).
It is the failure to have this distinction in mind that leads to scientism--or the belief that the scientific method is universally applicable to all knowledge when this is plainly not the case. Science does not tell us that 1+1=2. Reason alone tells us that 1+1=2. This is not a matter of fact, but of truth.
OK - if you make that distinction I am of course cognizant of the big distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning. However there is quite a strong sense in which Baysian probability theory is a generalisation of deductive logic, and if you combine this with objective Bayesian epistomology you get a world in which both deductive truth and inductive truth (which has an objective degree of belief based on the totality of real world evidence) coexist and both have a high standard of objectivity.
I was above objecting to the other uses of truth, as you know.
We can argue which theory of truth explains what truth is. I would argue for the same definition that I think you would argue for--correspondence theory. But even if we held different views how how truth works, we would still need to agree that truth and fact are two different things.
Well I'm not that concerned about the words, as long as all is consistent and we have clear definitions. For your final statement to be meaningful we must have definitions of truth and fact. If you identify these two things with "provable deductive propositions" (truth) and "inductive statements paired with objective levels of belief" (fact) certainly they are different things.
Which one of the Indiana Jones movies was it that begins with him noting that archaeology was the search for fact, and that if it's truth one is after, so and so's philosophy class down the hall is the place to be? This is entirely correct. Note though that in each of the Indie films, he ends up making a breakthrough concerning the truth--such as the power behind the Arc. This is typical Spielberg at its best.
OK - for that analogy to work I think you need to redefine truth to mean something other than deductive truth (which has no dependence on fact as defined above). I think perhaps you are reluctant to do that in the context of this debate?
Perhaps you want a definition:
fact: observations about the world
truth: inductive statements (about fact) coupled with level of belief in statement.
That would fit with the Ford analogy and of course what scientists also do. The Ford case is rough because the various supernatural phenomena so discovered are not fitted into any generally applicable theory, and therefore the individual inductive statements about such phenomena are too specific to be very strong. But if we accept the idea that there are a whole load of extra magical laws out there to discover through experiment on ancient artifacts and reading of ancient scrolls it is pefectly acceptable...
Best wishes, Tom