Talk-Polywell.org

I am the past me because I remember doing everything I did. No one else does, just as I don't remember doing anything anyone else has done. Yes, this is called the "memory theory of personal identity," and it was first proposed by Locke in the 1600s. And it's a very sensible theory, though folks wi...

This conversation has left me in the dust. I don’t take illegal drugs, but has anyone here been smoking marijuana while reading or participating in this thread? Care to elaborate? Any pot induced insights? I’m lost. Sorry about that — you're right, we haven't been very organized about it. Try the P...

Yes, a person becomes different over time. But if you are copied, what you will be and what he will be are different. So you're different people. So this is a problem for your view. No, it is not a problem, any more than becoming a different person over time is a problem. It's the exact same thing....

We all agree that the more time since a copy event, the less same the two will be. Which leads to the conclusion that their brains will be different. Which leads directly to the thought that they are different people. Tada! Yes — in exactly the same way that one person becomes gradually less the sa...

So, you've simply asserted your own argument: after you're dead, the person you are isn't there any more. I would agree with that. But that implies that if the person you are IS there, then you are not dead. This goes back to the 'given value of "me"' argument. After the moment of split, there is '...

It's true you are very similar from moment to moment, but when you start to think about copies it highlights the fact you may have diametrically opposed interests just from the fact you now occupy different physical avatars. Consider the Prestige situation -- one copy of you is about to die, so now...

You seem to be OK with painless obliteration as long as your pattern is reproduced elsewhere. Question: Would you require that your replica be instantiated the instant that you die? What if your pattern was stored, and a replica was recreated some time later? How about a thousand years from now? A ...

I don't see it either. The only copies of me I'd consider being me would be those thru whose eyes I could see at the same time as mine. Anything else is just a replica. This theory of personal identity is preposterous — it says, by very definition, that you can't have the same person at two differe...

My problem is simply that after you're dead, the pause in your mind never resumes. Agreed. This is a circular argument. We have a mind at time T1. At time T2, we have no mind (which could be something as innocuous as brain activity being halted by deep hypothermic surgery, or it could be something ...

I wouldn't kill myself before I slept, because I'm me . I'd try and kill the aliens! OK, but that's cheating. Suppose you can't; their technology is far beyond us (as it must be, if they're able to take you apart bit by bit and build another just like you). If you don't care about the guy who wore ...

Joe, I think we've come to an area we won't agree on. You say that you're ok with the idea of dieing, as long as there is a 'you' that survives. I think that you will change your mind as you're lying on your deathbed, waiting for the end. Maybe I'm wrong. You are. I've been debating this issue with...

I think the 'Prestige' argument is the best one. Questions of identity aside, one of you will die. I'm guessing, since you did upload your brain, you were worried about that. What if it's you? In this scenario, there are two copies of me. One copy will die; I'm OK with that, as long as one copy liv...

All of this talk of instantaneous identity is somewhat beside the point. I've thought about that before, and it doesn't explain why I am I and you are you, which is the main issue here. Yes, you are right, this is the issue called "personal identity" in philosophical circles. And here's the answer:...

The issue here seems to be continuity of consciousness. And yes, we do have periods of unconsciousness, but we have a *sense* of continuity. That sense is not possible either in The Prestige scenario, or in the mind-upload scenario because the continuity of consciousness is broken. As long as the p...

Heh, I wrote a post about the identity and consciousness problem about this a while back. Me too, back in 1997 . This is an old argument that was (in my opinion, at least) resolved years ago. First off, consider that the you of this moment is not, strictly speaking, the you of a decade ago, a year ...